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Introduction
‘Nothing to be done’ (Beckett 2012: 11). Samuel Beckett’s play Waiting for 
Godot is not about healthcare, but its first line seems to hover between prog-
nosis and diagnosis, suggesting that some kind of existential ‘doctoring’ is 
afoot, even as it is clear that no prescriptions are going to be dispensed. For 
the play’s two central characters, Vladimir and Estragon, ‘nothing to be 
done’ empties out the urgency of curative political action from Vladimir 
Lenin’s famous question: ‘What is to be done?’ Every possibility of change 
on the horizon of the play is derailed by the inertia of the fixing refrain: 
‘we’re waiting for Godot’. Waiting is the nothing that famously happened 
twice (Mercier 1956: 6), and came to be figured, in many early critical re-
ceptions of Beckett, as a representation of the existential human condition 
(Graver and Federman 1979). In the early 1950s, when the play was first 
performed, perhaps abstractions were more available for critical absorption 
than the possibility that postwar Europe was still in a present denuded of 
an inhabitable future (Kenner 1973: 133; Gibson 2010: 108) – an endless time 
of living on without any real hope of change in the wake of an unspecified 
disaster. Beckett’s play materializes a waiting that becomes a form of en-
durance through the promise of what might come to change the present for 
there is always some orientation towards the future in such practices. But 
the clear unavailability of Godot decouples the for (Schweizer 2008: 11), the 
most obvious preposition or relation, from the action of waiting.  Neither 
weak enough to cease and desist nor strong enough to leave, Vladimir and 
Estragon endure and persist, not, in the end, waiting for Godot but wait-
ing with and sometimes even on one another. Although in this chapter 
we will pay close attention to existential claims about the place of waiting 
in human experience, we will suggest that waiting is significantly shaped 
by the promises and narratives of particular historical moments and life-
worlds, and their distinct ways of understanding time. Indeed, if tarrying in 
Godot’s waiting room seems to speak to the existential human condition, we 
would argue that it is because the audiences the play found and continues 
to find persist in a time when the promises of the future feel increasingly 
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unavailable. Godot’s characters, alongside their audiences, wait with their 
diagnosis, which is also their prognosis: ‘nothing to be done’.
Perhaps one reason the slow modernism of Godot found and made its 
mark so sharply was its insistence on attending to the disavowed under-
side of the dominant timescapes of modernity. In 1931, Aldous Huxley was 
able to state that ‘[s]peed […] provides the one genuinely modern pleasure’ 
(Huxley 2001: 263), and it has been a critical commonplace to read aesthetic 
modernism as a reflection of the shock of the new and a pacing, racing pres-
ent. Planes, trains, and automobiles; ragtime and jazz; epiphanies and rev-
olutions;  telegraphs and telephones; production lines and new mass media: 
humanities scholarship has thoroughly mined how the modernity of the 
early and mid-twentieth century produced, for better and worse, acceler-
ated lives and shaped technologies capable of both registering and increas-
ing sensations of speed (Duffy 2009). Engaged with a more contemporary 
moment and less concerned with aesthetic practices, Paul Virilio (2006) 
has described how a logic of acceleration that has compressed, foreshort-
ened, and fractured time still sits at the heart of modernity and its drives 
towards destruction; while Jonathan Crary (2013) has critiqued a culture of 
24/7 availability fuelled by unsleeping technologies that has turned even the 
slowing of rest into an act of embodied resistance.
But there were always other times folded into the modern, as Elisabeth 
Kirtsoglou and Bob Simpson’s idea of ‘chronocracy’ suggests (this volume). 
For example, the managed and mechanized time of the working classes in 
a newly industrialized Europe was consistently used to service a version 
of a progressive future that was not shaped in their interests (Thompson 
1967). Craig Jeffery has also identified ‘chronic, fruitless waiting’ (Jeffery 
2010: 3) as a particular temporal experience of those colonized populations 
who provided much of the material resources for acceleration of Empire and 
modernity, noting it as a prominent feature of the experience of subaltern 
peoples globally since the 1960s. Bendixsen and Eriksen indeed point out 
that for certain groups waiting can be an expression of power and dom-
ination, generating vulnerability and humiliation (2018: 92). And while a 
‘new chronic’ temporal imaginary has become more generally palpable in 
the late liberalism of the contemporary global north (Cazdyn 2012), many 
of the most acute experiences of ‘chronic, fruitless waiting’ remain ‘zoned’ 
in specifically gendered, raced, and classed ways.1 As Lisa Baraitser has ar-
gued in Enduring Time (2017), despite an ever-increasing sense of accelera-
tion, because the spooling of time towards a possible future seems to have 
come unravelled in the contemporary moment, experiences of interruption, 
suspension, delay, and slowness strongly insist in affective life in highly dif-
ferential ways.
Here, however, we track this sense of time enduring rather than passing 
back to an earlier moment in the twentieth century, noting the ways in which 
waiting uncoupled from a future into which one might step came to be un-
derstood as a key feature of the affective condition termed ‘melancholia’, or, 
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in its more contemporary configuration, ‘depression’.2 This is not to claim 
that either condition is simply a response to modern times or, more strongly 
still, a social construction; nor is it to seek to medicalize distress that may 
be the result of other social relations of inequality or injustice (Thomas 
et al. 2018). Rather, we are interested in exploring how understandings of 
melancholia in twentieth-century Europe came to be focalized through par-
ticular ideas and sensations of stuck, suspended, impeded, or ungraspable 
time that shaped and continue to mould the contours of the temporal land-
scapes and psychological imaginaries of (late) modernity. Furthermore, we 
argue that care in the context of depression, which we understand as imbri-
cated with psychosocial relations and experiences and therefore ‘more than 
biomedical’ or psychological in constitution (Hinchliffe et al. 2018), may 
turn out to hinge around the offer and use of extended periods of time and 
the capacity to stay with those whose experience is that of a temporality that 
no longer flows.
Although the disciplinary perspective here is not anthropological, our 
concern with examining melancholia and depression through experiences 
and practices of waiting brings our chapter into contact with an important 
body of anthropological literature. In his interdisciplinary volume, Ghassen 
Hage describes waiting as an experience that is always both existential and 
historically articulated or situational (Hage 2009: 4, 6). Manpreet Janeja 
and Andreas Bandak similarly suggest that analysing waiting requires a ca-
pacity to shuttle between existential and more clearly social or institutional 
perspectives, as they demonstrate how focussed ethnographic work can illu-
minate both waiting’s poetics and its politics (Janeja and Bandak 2018: 3).3 
But this chapter uses a more dispersed, eclectic, and textual archive of ex-
perience to open up a theoretical account of melancholia/depression as a 
condition fundamentally entangled with existential, cultural, and socio- 
historical experiences and theorisations of European (late) modernity. Re-
maining broadly within the climate of these anthropological approaches to 
waiting, however, we propose that the remarkable tradition of phenomeno-
logical psychiatry from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century pro-
vides a significant opportunity to trace the relationship between accounts 
of lived experience of mental distress that emerged explicitly alongside ex-
istential philosophies, and more broadly socio-historical accounts of time.
As time became a topic of intense debate across the sciences and arts and 
humanities in early twentieth century Europe and North America, multi-
ple disciplines explored the tension between accounts of intuitive/ subjective 
time and understandings of mathematical/objective time (Fryxell 2019: 
5–6). Phenomenological psychiatry established its distinctive approach in 
this context by refusing the dominant third-person approach to psychopa-
thology exemplified by Emil Kraepelin (Broome et al. 2012: 90) in favour 
of paying careful attention to the first person, subjective experience of dis-
ruptions of well-being. The discipline was profoundly influenced by the new 
philosophies of temporality of Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger in the 
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first three decades of the twentieth century and one of its key insights was 
that chronic mental distress can be understood as a disturbance of a sense 
of lived time. However, phenomenological psychiatry paid scant explicit at-
tention to the temporal demands of treatment (Fryxell 2019: 23) – the time 
bound up in the intersubjectivity of the clinical encounter or simply the time 
that treatment takes.4 But psychoanalysis, which emerged alongside phe-
nomenological psychiatry in historical terms, insisted on reflecting, with 
particular self-consciousness, on the complex, often seemingly interminable 
temporality of treatment (Freud 1937).
Both phenomenological psychiatry and psychoanalysis developed in 
explicit dialogue with the conditions of modernity and alongside the dev-
astating experiences of industrialized warfare, but while phenomenology 
negatively articulated a temporal attitude of normalcy that recedes in ex-
periences of mental illness, psychoanalysis used the rhythms of psycho-
pathology and the inevitability of falling ill as a way of illuminating the 
structures of all mental life and of a psychic life of time that can never be 
simply linear, teleological, or smoothly flowing. Instead of suggesting that 
sensations of waiting without a for break apart what is proper to lived time, 
psychoanalysis comes to understand such experiences to be part of the inev-
itable conditions of psychic life. Psychoanalysis thus offers up a specifically 
chronic cure – the offer of time and care, and of remembering, repeating and 
working through (Freud 2014) – to contain, understand, and ameliorate the 
chronic condition of mental distress. By highlighting this link between the 
chronicity of the mind and the broader psychosocial contexts in which en-
durance plays out, this paper aims to open up a historically nuanced sense 
of the value of psychoanalytic temporal practices of waiting not for but with. 
We also suggest that by attending specifically to the relationships between 
depression, temporality, and historical and psychosocial experience, the 
urgent debates about uses of time in contemporary mental healthcare de-
livered by the UK’s National Health Service might tentatively be reframed.
Waiting in modern times
In his illuminating short book On Waiting, Harold Schweizer (2008) sug-
gests that although waiting is always essentially structured by its for, there is 
a value in decoupling this relation to get at the experience of waiting in itself 
that is all too easily passed over – where time is thick and slow, suspended, 
or extended. But we might infer from many of Schweizer’s examples that an 
attention to waiting in itself extrudes into visibility in a historical period 
where there has been a fraying of the possibility of arrival. Where waiting 
for God (the final backstop for all human experiences of endurance and 
unfulfillment) becomes less culturally available, at least in many  Western 
cultures of modernity, the possibility of messianic waiting also recedes 
and there is a waning of that sense of a final reckoning that structured, for 
example, medieval accounts of waiting. As Giorgio Agamben has shown, 
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medieval waiting might be understood as an experience of protracted immi-
nence between the full presence of the Messiah and the messianic event of 
the resurrection (Agamben 2003: 63–64). The time that remained in medi-
eval accounts – the time that it takes for time to come to an end – was both 
short and weighed heavily (67). Still, the notion of that final reckoning at the 
end of the ‘end times’ gave the for of waiting a structuring quality, leading 
to its implicit value in eschatological time. Indeed, this became explicitly 
the case in the invention of the idea of tariffed penance in Purgatory in the 
twelfth century (Le Goff 1981). In much pre- or para industrial life, waiting 
could also be gathered up into a more general sense of cyclical rhythms and 
the practices of activity they necessarily produced, as waiting had its part 
to play in contingent but imaginable returns. Reinhart Koselleck (2004) de-
scribes how in Western Christian cultures a particular linear time of ex-
pectation orientated towards the Second Coming of Christ persisted into 
the sixteenth century; but the timescapes of Western modernity decisively 
shifted with increasing secularization and an emphasis on human politi-
cal and economic activity as shaping the conditions of the future. In the 
philosophical conceptualizations of waiting that emerge in later modernity, 
however, it is the pointed banality of the object of waiting that comes to the 
fore as positivist accounts of time and progression begin to unravel: sugar 
dissolving in water for Bergson in 1907 (1922); the train at a boring country 
station for Heidegger in 1929/1930 (1995); Beckett’s Godot in 1953 as a white-
bearded fancy-dress version of a deity. This banalization of the object ena-
bles it to be bracketed off – a bracketing that permits an expansion of, and 
attention to, the phenomenological experience of waiting itself.
In the etymological history of the verb ‘to wait’ one can note the devel-
opment of a more passive relation to the contingency of the future and 
events that may or may not take place. The oldest occurrences of the term 
link it to the Old North French waitier, meaning to ‘to watch, lie in wait 
for’, the Old High German wahten, ‘to watch’, and the Germanic wak, to 
be wakeful. Both early transitive and intransitive forms connect waiting 
to the activity of lying in wait, often with hostile intent – to watch out or 
watch for, wakefully. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, from the 
1400s onwards, to wait (used either transitively or intransitively) becomes 
linked to ‘looking forward (with desire or apprehension) to (some future 
event or contingency); to continue in expectation of’, and then, somewhat 
later, to ‘remain[ing] for a time without something expected or promised’. 
This waiting in more passive expectation also develops into ‘remain[ing] 
in a place, defer[ing] one’s departure until something happens’, which be-
comes one of the dominant usages from the nineteenth century onwards. 
Significantly, this waiting in expectation or staying in place in the hope of 
something happening, falls out of transitive use in the nineteenth century, 
to be superseded by ‘awaiting’, or, more commonly now, by ‘waiting for’; 
but it is also still possible simply to wait, intransitively. One can find this 
usage as far back as the medieval period, the OED tells us, but it becomes 
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notably more common in modernity. Here, the unarticulated for, though it 
never completely disappears, may gesture towards nothing more specific 
than time passing. As ‘waiting’ develops in relation to historical circum-
stances, it becomes increasingly prone to spooling back from its object, to 
losing its preposition, either carelessly or purposefully, and to shedding its 
wakeful projections and the promise of its future. It seems that the tem-
poral, embodied experience of waiting itself becomes a distinct object of 
attention only in the face of the growing uncertainty that it will ever be 
fulfilled, or that one will ever do one’s time.
Philosophies that concentrate on the experience of waiting that resist be-
ing subordinated to their for indeed emerge in the twentieth century as part 
a critique of the increasing quantification and rationalization of time. As 
is well known, the advent of both the railway and telegraph wire towards 
the end of the nineteenth century required and therefore enabled the de-
velopment of national time regimes, as timetables demanded synchronized 
clocks across geographical regions (Kern 1983). Waiting, in turn, became 
more clearly associated with the redundancies built into standardized or 
industrialized time in which human duration could be rendered expendable 
in relation to the time tabled according to the needs of modernity. Yet as 
time became standardized, more easily quantifiable, and more susceptible 
to being cut up into blocks and exchanged as units,5 there was a cotermi-
nous sense that temporality might more authentically be found within ex-
periences in which time’s felt pace of passing, and its relativity, became the 
essential mode of measure. Henri Bergson’s famous 1907 account of waiting 
for sugar to dissolve in water thus starts to pay attention to the experience of 
just waiting. This is waiting that enables a perception of subjective time pre-
cisely because the subject is thrown out of sync with something that passes 
smoothly:
If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy nilly, wait until 
the sugar melts […] For here the time I have to wait is not that math-
ematical time which would apply equally well to the entire history of 
the material world […] It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, 
with a certain portion of my own durations, which I cannot protract or 
contract as I like. It is no longer something thought, it is something lived.
(Bergson 1922: 9–10)
Bergson shows here that time, which for him is famously the qualitative ex-
perience of duration, obtrudes for philosophical reflection precisely as it re-
sists being seized by it. We perceive time as it refuses to align itself with our 
intentions and instead we feel seized by it, as if from the outside. As ‘some-
thing lived’, the experience of time that finds us in waiting is one that endures 
in neither complete passivity – for we may choose to wait, or not – nor in a 
position where time can simply be subordinated to the subject’s projects.
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Bergson uses a phenomenology of waiting to illuminate the nature of be-
ing in time precisely because the time that flows, and in which we might 
ourselves be absorbed, is not easily available to conscious reflection. It is 
so transparent to us that we tend to see through it, in fleeting spontaneity. 
Waiting, however, disturbs the putatively ‘natural’ experience of being at 
one with time’s passage; it therefore acts as a form of phenomenological 
 epoché, a suspension of assumptions and ideas about the experience of the 
world – in this case the experience of a time that flows – to concentrate 
instead on how things might appear to consciousness (Husserl 2014). For 
phenomenologists, there is a similar disruption of normative conceptions 
of temporality that come to consciousness in and as pathology. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty was to argue in 1945 that the threads that invisibly bind our 
sense of a compliant body (one that expresses a subject coherently posi-
tioned and unified in relation to temporal intentions) are crucially loosened 
in the experience of illness:
the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual 
life – is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us 
our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and 
moral situation […] It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity 
of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. And it is this 
which ‘goes limp’ in illness.
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 136)
In both waiting and in illness,6 the sense of a body and mind functioning as 
a smooth expression of the intentional subject, in sync with a temporality 
that flows according to an intentional arc, is rendered out of phase.
Time out of mind
Writing in 1933 on the subject of Lived Time, the phenomenological psy-
chiatrist Eugène Minkowski suggested that mental illness, as part of its de-
fining feature, detaches human beings from the kind of temporality that 
he sees as common and comfortable to human life: a ‘lived synchronism 
that we expect to find in the general feeling of moving with time and in step 
with it’ (Minkowski 1970: 69). Drawing on Bergson’s account of duration, 
Minkowski argues that the mind that is subject to psychopathology cannot 
properly orientate itself towards lived time. Phenomenological texts such as 
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) and his lectures on The Funda-
mental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929–1930) had suggested how temporality 
was the basis of anxiety and a sense of the immanence of death. But whereas 
Heidegger imagines that anxiety and an awareness of ‘being-towards-death’ 
produce the conditions for Dasein (the kind of being that humans have) 
to have an authentic engagement with the present and the future as ‘its 
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ownmost possibility’ (Heidegger 1967), Minkowski describes how waiting 
can be entwined with the nameless dread of what cannot be seized. Writing 
positively of ‘activity’, Minkowski notes that ‘far from feeling imprisoned in 
the sphere of my activity and feeling that I bang up against its walls, I feel, 
on the contrary, at ease and take pleasure in moving without hindrance’ 
(Minkowski 1970: 85). But what Minkowski calls ‘expectation’ is different:
Expectation […] englobes the whole living being, suspends his activity, 
and fixes him anguished, in expectation. It contains a factor of bru-
tal arrest and renders the individual breathless. One might say that the 
whole of becoming concentrated outside of the individual swoops down 
in a powerful and hostile mass, attempting to annihilate him; it is like 
an iceberg surging abruptly in front of the prow of a ship, which in an 
instant will smash fatally against it. Expectation penetrates the indi-
vidual to his core, fills him with terror before this unknown and unex-
pected mass, which will engulf him in an instant.
(Minkowski 1970: 87–88)
First drafted just after the Armistice in 1918, this chapter was later called, 
simply, ‘The Future’ – a title that ontologizes but also dehistoricizes and 
depoliticizes the waiting it invokes. Nevertheless, the chapter mobilizes 
historically specific metaphors such as the sinking of Titanic in 1912 and 
experiences that read like a ‘phenomenology of life in the trenches’ (Kern 
1983: 90) in its attention to waiting as a temporally extended, anguished ex-
pectation of imminent destruction. In this account of ‘expectation’, it is as 
if socio-historical experiences of waiting have ‘englobed’ both the ontolog-
ical account and the seeming ontological propriety of a present and future 
through and in which time should flow.
Literary critic Kate McLoughlin has suggested that a disruption of du-
ration is a particular precipitate of industrialized warfare for combatants 
(McLoughlin 2012: 107–134). Paul Saint-Amour similarly figures anxious 
waiting, and the distortions of temporality experienced in the face of a 
future towards which the self cannot be orientated, as a specific response 
to the global conflicts of the twentieth century (Saint-Amour 2015). Saint-
Amour indeed uses Minkowski to take aim at psychoanalytically inflected 
accounts of trauma, arguing that the violence of war is not just extended 
through a traumatic return of the past; rather, in an era characterized 
by the imminent threat of ‘total war’ via aerial bombardment, ‘violence 
anticipated is already violence unleashed’ (2015: 13). The threat of a to-
tal war that impinges on both civilian and military populations might be 
understood as producing ‘a proleptic mass traumatization’, the symptoms 
of which exist ‘not in the wake of a past event, but in the shadow of a fu-
ture one’ (2015: 7–8), even though, we would argue, this trauma must be 
activated and charged by at least a proximity to events in the past. But 
Minkowski’s more ontological attempt to anatomize the disturbance of 
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lived time in mental illness seems to intuit something that Saint-Amour 
allows to slip from view: the way in which the propulsive pump of anxiety 
about an expected yet indeterminate disaster shifts into something more 
like depressed affect as the relationship towards the future is suspended, 
time cannot pass, and the present and past swell.
Minkowski’s own traumatic experience of war and the social repression 
of its effects slowed the writing of his book to a stand-still (1970: 7), and 
perhaps he only moved his work forward by turning to endogenous depres-
sion rather than ‘reactive depressions’ that could be the long-term effect 
of combat experience. For Minkowksi was able to claim phenomenolog-
ical, ontological insights about the human capacity to march in step or 
fall out of phase with the flow of lived time. Indeed, he showed how such 
depressions reveal something essential about the shaping of human tem-
poral experiences; they ‘express a profound modification of the structure 
of time, a modification that reduces to a more or less broad contrast be-
tween immanent time and transitive time’ (Minkowski 1970: 299), or the 
distinction between what he calls, following the phenomenological psychi-
atrist Erwin Straus, ‘ego time’ (a subjective sense of lived time), and ‘world 
time’ (a shared external experience of time) (Minkowski 1970: 297). Time 
is, instead, ‘englobed’ in and by forms that are detached from progression. 
To use Minkowski’s patient’s own words: ‘I feel displaced in relation to 
life. I feel time flee, but I don’t have the sensation of following the move-
ment; I have the feeling of turning in the opposite direction than the earth’ 
(Minkowski 1970: 332).
The observation that in melancholia ‘immanent time seems to slow down 
remarkably, even to stop’ (Minkowski 1970: 297–298) is not new to the 
twentieth century. Thomas Burton famously noted in his 1621 Anatomy of 
 Melancholy that when ruminating on ‘what I have ill done’, ‘methinks time 
does move very slow’ (Democritus 1806: 12). In 1928, Straus picks up on a 
temporality which does not and cannot flow or unfold:
When depression brings internal time to a standstill, there is no longer 
the possibility of resolving experiences […] by stepping on into the fu-
ture. Inner experience has reached an impasse […] The demands for con-
clusion that emanate from things cannot be fulfilled in the future-less 
experience of the depressive.
(Straus 2012: 211)
Straus goes on to note that
[s]ick people report that time runs dry, seems in their anxiety to have 
come to a stop. Or again, that the passage of time in general has slowed 
down, or that time only moves forward when a steady mechanical ac-
tivity is taking place.
(Straus 2012: 214)
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In 1928, Viktor von Gebsattel also reported one of his patient’s expe-
riences of temporal disruption in melancholia, though here time is not 
brought to a standstill; instead the future is cancelled because time cannot 
be contained:
I am constantly thinking that time is flying past. As I am speaking with 
you, with every word I’m thinking ‘past’, ‘past’, ‘past’. […]
Every single movement makes me think: now I am doing this, now 
that […] It is terrible thinking like this, it’s a type of killing (?), that’s why 
it’s related to thinking about suicide.
(Von Gebsattel 2012: 215)7
Quoting Von Gebsattel’s case study, Minkowski notes the terror such a 
future invokes through its hostile force (Minkowski 1970: 302–303). He 
adds that what someone might try to do in the face of such depression 
is attempt to reinstate ‘mechanical progression’ through obsessive symp-
toms that give rise to an illusion of forward movement, but in fact only fill 
the present by filling in for the weakening dynamism of time (Minkowski 
1970: 299).
Whether it is a sluggish over-abundance of time that does not pass, then, 
or an excess of time that cannot be contained but speeds by like a freight 
train mowing down the person standing helplessly in its path, depression 
here tracks modernity’s anxious relation to a temporality repeatedly im-
agined as having fallen out of phase with the proper rhythms of human 
life – a time that is either too slow or too fast to be absorbed, used, and then 
passed through the subject.8 If, as Hage puts it, ‘[w]aiting indicates that we 
are engaged in, and have expectations from, life’ (Hage 2009: 1), then it is 
precisely this idea of waiting, in which a present might be used productively 
as it flows into a future of achievement, that begins to slip away. Instead, 
there is an obsessive repetition of the same:
No action, no desire emerged which, emanating from the present, could 
go toward the future across this succession of dull and similar days. 
Because of this, each day had an unusual independence. They did not 
vanish into the sensation of the continuity of life. Each one emerged as 
a separate island in the dark sea of becoming.
(Minkowski 1970: 186)
As Minkwoski puts it later, ‘When the flow of life is barred, immanent 
death is also arrested. Transitive death then becomes mistress of the mind’ 
(Minkowski 1970: 304). Dependent relationships, both on the future and, 
crucially, by implication, on others, dwindle defensively into islands of di-
minished, brutally self-contained insufficiency in which it feels impossible 
either to live or to die.
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Time as care
In Being and Time, Heidegger argued that Dasein is significantly ‘tempo-
rised’ by its involvements, its inclination, its leaning towards a world and 
ability to make use of it as part of its own projects – its ‘Being-ahead-of-itself ’ 
(Heidegger 1967: 236). But although Heidegger uses the words care [Sorge] 
and concern [Besorgen] to describe his understanding of these ontological 
possibilities of being-in-the-world and involved with it (83–84), they are not 
freighted with the strong connotations of intersubjectivity, interdepend-
ence, and ethics that undergird more social conceptions of care. Instead, 
Heidegger’s accounts of care and ‘being-with’ are more concerned with in-
volvements that are pragmatically useful to Dasein’s projects. As Gallagher 
and Jacobson (2012) have argued, Heidegger has a significantly underdevel-
oped account of the social that lacks any strong sense that humans might 
discover the world through relations with others that have already been estab-
lished both psychologically and ontologically through primary intersubjectiv-
ity.9 The ethical lacunae in Heidegger’s thinking were also implicitly taken up 
by Emmanuel Levinas in his series of lectures delivered in 1946/1947, Time and 
the Other. There, Levinas argued that relationships with others and alterity are 
in fact ontologically primordial, preceding and producing the very possibility of 
selfhood rather than emerging from it, as Heidegger had argued (Levinas 1987). 
For Levinas, others are also not simply met in time in ways that ‘temporise’ 
the subject’s experience; rather, time is a primordial condition that enables any 
meeting between self and other or any possibility of sociality. ‘The dialectic of 
time is the very dialectic of the relationship with the other’ (Levinas 1987: 93), he 
insists. If this is so, when the sense of a time that passes and can be stepped into 
or inhabited is relinquished in favour of those ‘separate island[s] in the dark sea 
of becoming’ that characterize depression, it is perhaps the fundamental aware-
ness of the ontological possibilities of being-in-the-world and  being-with-others 
(in both Heideggerian and Levinasian senses) that shears away.
The question that remains for phenomenological psychiatry, however, is 
how might these experiences of temporal disruptions, so deeply entangled 
with the disturbance of the possibility of relationships with others, be cared 
for or treated? If we move towards more social conceptions in which care 
can be described as ‘everything that we do to maintain, continue, and re-
pair our “world” so that we can live in it as well as possible’ (Tronto 2013: 
19), then a disturbance of the ability to encounter others and to move out-
wards from the solitary self in existential crisis into a ‘world’ made possible 
in and through time, seem significantly entangled with a sense that the basic 
temporal conditions that enable caring and being cared for have radically 
slipped from view. And one response, one offer of care, might therefore be 
an insistence on a form of treatment that takes time and the relationship 
with an other as its primary materials.
In ‘The Scandal of the Timeless’, Julia Kristeva situates Heidegger’s ac-
count of time and care alongside those of Bergson and his contemporary, 
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Sigmund Freud (Kristeva 2003). She sees each philosophical position as 
subverting the Western philosophical elision of temporality with conscious-
ness, giving way, she argues, to articulations of extra-subjective temporality. 
As we have seen, Heidegger ‘ontologises’ time as care so that time can never 
be simply thought of as ‘subjective’:
Understood as the ontological meaning of care (Sorge), this temporal-
ity […] conditions the categories of our existence in time (past, present, 
future) without being reduced to it. The human being is a being-there, 
a Dasein, a thrown being, always ‘ahead-of-itself’ and, for this reason, 
care-ridden: a ‘being-towards-death.
(Kristeva 2003: 29)
Bergson’s duration, on the other hand, while having a psychical dynamic, 
is anterior to the sphere of the psyche. Duration is not a product of con-
sciousness, but an embodied memory of matter that is in constant vibra-
tion. Duration therefore dematerializes matter, with matter itself becoming 
a form of ‘an indefinitely dilated past’, and duration emerges as ‘the most 
contracted degree of matter’ (Kristeva 2003: 29).
It is Freud, however, whom Kristeva identifies as offering a linear con-
ception of the time of consciousness within which he inscribes a fundamen-
tal heterogeneity that nevertheless frustrates linear time. Zeitlos, Freud’s 
term for the timelessness or the lost time of the unconscious, becomes, for 
 Kristeva, a form of impossible temporalizing that suspends or frustrates the 
everyday meaningful modes of existence in the world which are reliant on 
time that is bound into sequence. Los – to come off, to come loose – is not 
connected to the ordinary or everyday. The timelessness of the unconscious 
signifies something closer to that which is un-timed, unleashed, or unbound. 
Rather than thinking of Freud’s unconscious as an absence of time, she ar-
gues that Zeitlos signals a timelessness beyond time that ‘encroaches on a 
pre-psychical time and approaches the somatic’ (Kristeva 2003: 31). Zeitlos 
gestures towards a time that is prior to the psychical binding of time, which 
she situates as the rhythm or pulse of the soma.
This tension between bound and unbound time, between the linear con-
ception of the time of consciousness and the timelessness of unconscious 
processes, plays out in psychoanalytic treatment, which could itself be un-
derstood as a treatment of or with time. Kristeva draws out three modalities 
of timelessness that articulate analytic experience. These are the memory 
trace; the cyclical process in psychoanalytic treatment of ‘working through’; 
and the time it takes for the dissolution of the transference. Memory, as 
Freud saw it, is a lasting trace of excitation remaining in unconscious life, 
which he asserted was indestructible and yet displaceable through the pro-
duction of symptoms that ‘remember’ differently. Working through is the 
struggle we have with resistance – we don’t want to know in conscious or 
historical time what we do know in unconscious timelessness, so we need to 
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constantly deflect that knowledge. The practice of analytic treatment entails 
approaching resistance not once but again and again in such a way as the 
analyst must remain unconcerned with the outcome of the approach, allow-
ing the analysand to come to care about their particular truth. Finally the 
dissolution of the transference is the temporality of the end of the analysis 
itself. It signals the time of separation that confronts the patient with the 
possibility of the analyst’s death and their own susceptibility to dissolution. 
In order to come to care enough about one’s own death and the death of the 
analyst, some working through has to have occurred in which an experience 
of suffering or psychic pain has been marked by temporal difference – by 
the waiting, delay, or lost time of both analyst and analysand. The paradox 
then of treatment is that facing one’s own potential dissolution and being 
able to bear living on beyond the end of the analysis requires the retroactive 
scene of having waited together. Psychoanalytic care, in this account, func-
tions through a form of prolonged waiting with.
Despite the psychoanalytic emphasis on the timelessness of the uncon-
scious, it is important to note the ways in which psychoanalysis and its 
theory of melancholia/depression emerge, in both theoretical and practical 
terms, from the conditions of twentieth-century modernity and particularly 
those experiences of violence and hate manifested through war. Freud’s 
‘Mourning and Melancholia’ was first published in 1915 and offers an ac-
count of melancholia in which the otherness of the lost love object and, by 
implication, the ungraspable temporal relationship with the past and the 
future that the other symbolizes and enables, collapses (Freud 2017). As the 
ego incorporates the object into itself by aggressively devouring it, it turns 
its hate towards the lost other inwards, implying a temporal structure that 
no longer moves, even minimally, outwards from the self through an incli-
nation towards the other. Such melancholia therefore becomes the obverse 
of care, at least as we have been defining it here.10
British psychoanalysts working in the middle of the twentieth century un-
der the influence of Melanie Klein also brought the external experience of 
two world wars into charged contact with the time of psychic life and the 
psychic life of time. As Michal Shapira has shown, these analysts were con-
cerned to anatomize the idea of a ‘“war inside”, that is, what they saw as the 
aggression, sadism, and anxiety that in part constitute every subjectivity’ 
(Shapira 2013: 49). For Klein, writing in 1946, the child’s loss of complete 
identification with the primary object, usually the mother, is an inevitable 
part of development; but in order to preserve the idea of the good lost object 
that can be held inside, the child splits it spatially, keeping the good object 
at some distance from a bad object that attacks both from within and from 
the external world, and is felt to be responsible for painful but inevitable 
experiences of frustration and loss. The movement from this spatializing 
‘paranoid schizoid’ position to a ‘depressive position’ that recognizes the ag-
gression of the attack on the loved object and looks, remorsefully, to repair 
the damage done – to put it back together over and through time – signals an 
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emergent capacity to understand the object in reality as separate and neither 
wholly good nor fully bad, but both good and bad (Klein 1946).
As Hage astutely notes of psychoanalytic theory:
waiting has always been seen as foundational in the formation of the 
affective self, particularly at the moment of separation from the mother 
or the breast. It is not far from the truth to say that in psychoanalytic 
theory the self takes shape the very moment it starts waiting.
(Hage 2009: 9)
In terms of melancholia, the psychoanalyst David Bell suggests that Klein’s 
model articulates how serious depressive illness can emerge in the temporal 
extension of schizoid processes driven by an ‘incapacity to manage the psy-
chic pain characteristic of the depressive position’ (Bell 2000: 25) – the real-
ity of loss and separation and the dependence upon others that demands an 
inclination, a relationship, with an other and an unknown future in which 
time cannot simply be controlled or ‘filled in’. In their account of waiting, 
Janeja and Bandak make the central claim that ‘waiting must be scrutinized 
in relation to the central figures of hope, doubt and uncertainty’ (2018: 1). 
Certainly the capacity of the analyst to bear repeated ‘paranoid schizoid’ 
attacks, and offer, time and again, a form of understanding that interprets 
the aggression rather than defensively throws it back or denies it, marks out 
the work of psychoanalysis in the face of depression. This practice, however, 
entails a mode of waiting that deliberately suspends hope, and offers instead 
a commitment to work under the conditions of permanent doubt and uncer-
tainty. Only through staying with a time that is experienced by both analyst 
and analysand as phenomenologically ‘not flowing’ can depression have the 
chance of being understood. This staying with, this waiting with, neverthe-
less gestures towards at least the possibility of a future that might not merely 
be a repetition of a stuck past or a swelling, obsessively revolving present.
One major problem for developing an evidence base for the efficacy and 
therefore potential efficiency of psychoanalytic treatment is the need for 
long-term studies that can capture this slow process of endurance when 
time, for the patient, might have effectively stopped unfolding in the ways 
we have described above. In 2015, the first findings were published of a ten-
year long randomized controlled trial on treatment-resistant depression and 
long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Fonagy et al. 2015). The  Tavistock 
Adult Depression Study suggests that previous research had been poor in 
assessing the efficacy of psychoanalytic psychotherapy precisely because 
it had struggled to take into account the chronic qualities of treatment- 
resistant depression, or the effects of a very long and slow treatment process. 
In the study, 44% of the patients who were given 18 months of weekly psy-
choanalytic psychotherapy no longer had a major depressive disorder when 
followed up two years after therapy had ended; for those receiving the cur-
rent NHS treatments of choice (anti-depressants and short-term Cognitive 
Depressing time 117
Behavioural Therapy) the figure was 10%. While only 14% of those receiv-
ing the psychoanalytic psychotherapy recovered fully, for those receiving 
current NHS treatments of choice full recovery occurred in just 4% of pa-
tients. In every six-month period in which participants were tracked (over 
a total of 3.5 years), the chances of a remission from depressive symptoms 
for those receiving psychoanalytic psychotherapy were 40% higher than for 
those receiving the current treatments. After two years of follow-up, 30% of 
those receiving the psychoanalytic therapy had remission from their depres-
sive symptoms; in the control condition this figure was only 4%.
Between 1998 and 2012, England saw a 165% increase in the prescription 
of anti-depressants (Spence et al. 2014: 4), and in 2016, 64.7 million antide-
pressant items were dispensed and 33.7 million (108.5%) more than in 2006 
(Thomas et al. 2018: 2). A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of 
available data on treatment for major depressive disorders has suggested 
that antidepressants are demonstrably effective (Cipriani et al. 2019). Nev-
ertheless, as noted above, relapse rates remain high (Kirsch et al. 2008), 
particularly when tracked across the decades over which chronic conditions 
often play out, and side effects can be significant (Gøtzsche 2015). Recent 
work on prescribing practices in NHS has also revealed a tendency for GPs 
to medicalize distress in low-income communities facing chronic conditions 
of material poverty and experiencing the effects of the pervasive sense of 
shame produced by political and broader social discourses surrounding 
‘benefits’ or ‘welfare’ (Thomas et al. 2018).
The neurobiological understandings of mental illness that underpin cur-
rent prescription regimes, alongside the Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies initiative for anxiety and depression that has prioritized relatively 
low-cost digitally enabled therapies and cognitive behavioural therapy, have 
meant that psychoanalysis has lost most of its traction in the National Health 
Service in England.11 To suggest a reconsideration of psychoanalysis in rela-
tion to the treatment of depression in the NHS in this climate is not to deny 
the difficult realities of straitened finances, the particular ways in which cli-
nicians are acutely time-starved, and clinicians’ pragmatic attempts to ame-
liorate distress in the face of what are felt to be intractable problems caused 
by government policies (Thomas et al. 2018) and significant constraints on 
prescribing practices. In particular, we are not suggesting that we return to 
psychoanalysis in a way that resonates with the current veneration of ‘the 
slow’. We note that a certain resurgence of psychoanalysis in public dis-
course in the last few years saw Stephen Grosz’s The Examined Life become 
a bestseller serialized in 2013 on BBC Radio 4. This kind of work implicitly 
connects psychoanalytic practice to an elegiac mode in which the equation 
of time and money is not addressed and there is no scarcity of resources to 
pay for treatment. We want to suggest, however, that we might do psycho-
analysis a disservice in terms of its ability to speak to our present moment 
if we hold it to the romance of the slow and to fantasies of plenitude – to a 
world where there is no gap between need and fulfilment. Our point is rather 
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that our current times are shot through with a more resistant, more chronic 
relation to time, and that in this context psychoanalysis provides a rare dis-
course that enables us to articulate the link between chronic time and prac-
tices of care that inhabit and use time’s complex chronicity.
We finish by returning to Beckett. One of the things that much of his 
drama makes clear, through his strange ‘pseudo-couples’ who remain 
bound to one another, is that, in the absence of a future towards which one 
can orientate oneself, one might wait not for, in solitary existential crisis, but 
with. In Beckett’s Endgame, which has been interpreted as both a displaced 
account of the Second World War and an anxious anticipation of a nuclear 
holocaust, Hamm cannot stand, and Clov cannot sit. Clov tells Hamm there 
is no more painkiller; indeed, all the things they may have once been waiting 
for have been exhausted. Even the alarm clock does not work anymore, yet 
the time that time takes to come to an end remains. They endure in an exten-
uated yet nevertheless clearly finite state. They remain, dependent, waiting; 
in their terms they are ‘obliged to each other’ (Beckett 2012: 90). Though 
Beckett is always prone to undercutting his awareness and acceptance of 
interdependency with cruelty, we could at least say that Hamm and Clov 
care for one another through persistence, through an insistence on waiting 
with. Where depression collapses experience back into subjectivity, waiting, 
which is not to be completely subsumed under anxious anticipation, active 
expectation, or the stuckness of depressed time, invokes intersubjectivity; 
it fashions a minimal openness to a future in care and dependence. To be 
dependent is, after all, literally to understand oneself to be hanging – like a 
pendulum, suspended – from an other and from a future towards which one 
might find oneself at least minimally inclined.
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Notes
 1 See Schwartz 1975; Sharma 2014; Bendixsen and Eriksen 2018.
 2 To address melancholia and depression together is not to claim that they are 
simply different words for a transhistorical condition with stable features – in 
other words, a ‘natural kind’. We note that there might be some significant dif-
ferences between the ways in which melancholia and depression are defined and 
represented. Nevertheless, if we take the position that psychological objects nec-
essarily have an ‘ambiguous’ status (Hayward 2011: 526) – held between ‘natural 
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kinds’, disciplinary constructions, and ideological formations and subject to 
feedback as individuals are thrown into a complex confluence of biological and 
social causes and effects – early twentieth-century melancholia and depression 
have significant similarities in the ways in which they figure the importance of 
temporal disturbance.
 3 Further recent examples include Liene Ozolina’s ethnography of waiting in 
post-soviet Latvian workfare programmes; Bruce O’Neill’s ethnographic study 
which tracks boredom in urban homeless populations in Bucharest; and Javier 
Auyero’s (2012) study, Patients of the State, which focusses on welfare offices 
in  Argentina, and the indefinite waiting imposed on those who need social 
assistance.
 4 This is particularly remarkable in the case of the phenomenological psychiatrist, 
Eugène Minkowski, whose 1923 paper, ‘Findings in a Case of Schizophrenic De-
pression’, drew from his experience of living day and night over a period of two 
months with a patient as his personal physician (Minkowski 1958).
 5 This idea of time is most fully articulated in Frederick Winslow Taylor’s theories 
and practices of scientific management between the 1890s and 1910s.
 6 See also Havi Carel (2016).
 7 For a more contemporary account, see the philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe (2014) 
on how people with depression frequently report an alteration in their phenom-
enological experience of time.
 8 See Goodstein on boredom, and Duffy on speed.
 9 In 1943, one of the first phenomenological psychiatrists, Ludwig Binswanger 
(1964), made a similar criticism of Heidegger.
 10 ‘Care’ is, of course, also a synonym for woe.
 11 Significantly, psychoanalysis was in fact key in the emergence of models of care 
in the development of General Practice in the NHS in the 1940s and 1950s (see 
Balint 1957).
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